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Jonathan Sholl1
 Springer International Publishing AG 2015
The philosophy of medicine is a young yet burgeoning field within philosophy of
science and like nearly all areas of philosophy this one too has generated canonical
texts, reactions, stalemates and progress. The volume, Classification, Disease and
Evidence, greatly contributes to this field, comprising essays covering a wide array
of topics and questions, all of which are grounded in recent empirical and
philosophical research. The editors’ introduction nicely recapitulates some of the
key areas within the philosophy of medicine and distinguishes it from broader
historical reflections on medicine, what could be called ‘‘medical philosophy’’ (p.
7), such as can be found in Epicurus, Descartes or Wittgenstein. The philosophy of
medicine is generally organized around three main sets of questions: the nature of
health and disease, the relation between medicine and the life sciences, and the role
of statistical methods, all of which are addressed in this volume’s contributions.
While ethical issues are also addressed, the general area of ‘bioethics’ is largely set
aside, reflecting certain divisions within the history of philosophical reflections on
medicine.
The first four essays approach the issue of conceptualizing health and disease,
either within medicine more generally or psychiatry more specifically, and do so in
rather novel ways. While there are some who explore the philosophical implications
of pitting subjective first-person descriptions of illness against objective third-
person descriptions of disease, Cunningham’s essay convincingly argues that the
dualisms such as art versus science or subjective versus objective are based on
antiquated theories of science and objectivity and are even harmful as they hinder a
scientific investigation of vital aspects of medical practice, of exploring the ‘‘science
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of the art of medicine’’ (p. 13). This emphasis on renewing the discussion over
empirical approaches to medical questions is also taken up in Lemoine’s insightful
essay, which seeks to move beyond traditional conceptual analyses of disease to a
project of the naturalization of disease. To do so involves a series of shifts, such as
moving from disease judgment to disease explanation or from nosology to
pathophysiology; from deducing whether something is a disease based on its
meeting necessary and sufficient conditions to an inductive approach starting from
empirical properties of biological systems that can provide a causal or explanatory
theory, such as can be seen in network medicine and systems biology. An
interesting, though controversial, aspect of such an approach is that it does not take
any given classification for granted, which implies that what is typically considered
a ‘healthy’ state, such as pregnancy, ageing, or even menstruation, may need to be
reconsidered as ‘diseased’ if naturalization is successful. The next two essays focus
more specifically on psychiatry. On one level, Murphy argues that with a more
nuanced account of the ‘medical model’ of mental illness we can see how different
(and ultimately irreducible) levels of causal explanations, from the biological and
the psychological to the social or environmental, can be appealed to without leading
to reductionism. Demazeux takes this issue a bit further, arguing that the main
attempts to find some objective basis for psychiatric categories by appealing to
biological functions, and thereby respond to the challenges raised by anti-
psychiatry, have failed either to objectively distinguish the normal and the
pathological (Boorse) or to prevent the justification of nearly any diagnosis due to
the vagueness of the theory (Wakefield). This first section, then, forces us to
reconsider the very method of conceptual analysis as a means to understand health
and disease, and also whether we should be looking for something other than
functions to help demarcate these two realms.
The next three essays are gathered around the issue of classification, though their
focus is more on questions concerning the different kinds of explanation in
biomedicine. Me´thot and Alizon’s empirically-driven essay demonstrates that there
are two styles of scientific reasoning when it comes to answering the question of
why parasites harm their host: one molecular, the other ecological. They nicely
illustrate both the need for and difficulty of integrating these two approaches so as to
understand specific cases, such as the 1918–1919 influenza pandemic, but also
competing explanations in the life sciences more generally, an issue Me´thot has also
explored in terms of Darwinian and evolutionary medicine. From here, the essays
turn to explanations in psychiatry and biomedical genetics. Like Demazeux, Singy
also argues that the DSM, and by extension Wakefield’s approach, has failed to
provide a convincing objective description of mental disorders, and Singy then
draws out some interesting practical implications concerning the use of the DSM in
courtrooms. Since only incapacity is what matters for legal determinations, and
since even the DSM claims that the presence of a disorder does not imply an
incapacity, then the DSM should be taken out of the courtroom, even if objective
definitions of psychiatric disorders were possible. While an interesting question to
raise would be whether defining disease or illness precisely in terms of incapacities
would challenge this practical divide, Singy’s text remains extremely topical due to
the recent publication of the DSM-5. The final essay in this section is an attempt to
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clarify what we mean by ‘genetic disease’ by looking at how genes are
experimentally determined to be causally linked to disease phenotypes. Dekeuwer
suggests, though does not fully explicate, that three different types of genetic
causality are important to understand the concept of genetic disease, an approach
that could benefit from other philosophical research on genetic theories of disease.
The final three essays explore the area of evidence, looking at different kinds of
medical reasoning and assessment, from diagnosis and epidemiological risk factors
to quality assessment tools. This is the most challenging of the sections, both since
the essays tackle increasingly specialized topics, and due to the somewhat abstract
level of analysis. After distinguishing different forms of diagnostic reasoning
(probabilistic, causal, and pathophysiological), which together comprise the ‘‘art of
recognizing diseases’’ (p. 166), Coste shows how certain tensions between these
approaches are rooted in older medical discussions which run up to the present day
in concerns over the efficacy of evidence-based medicine. Possibly her more
interesting contribution is in showing how these commonly used diagnostic forms
are limited due to the fact that many diseases have either unknown or poorly
understood causes and/or mechanisms. Giroux takes up the issue of causal
explanations within epidemiology, showing that there is often a tension between
probabilistic and mechanistic accounts of how risk factors are said to be causally
linked to a given disease. She ultimately argues for an irreducible complementarity
between these two approaches, such that while statistics show that a causal relation
exists, mechanisms are needed to explain how the cause relates to the effect. The
final essay by Stegnenga explores the rather difficult terrain of developing tools to
evaluate medical evidence, such as what kind of knowledge is produced by
randomized controlled trials. He argues that even though quality assessment tools
show low inter-rater reliability and low inter-tool reliability they are still the best
tools we have to carry out such assessments.
Ultimately, this volume challenges and reframes many traditional problems
within philosophy of medicine and provides new areas for future research. It will
also help to show not only that the philosophy of medicine in general and the
philosophy of psychiatry in particular are far from being insular or esoteric fields,
but have much to contribute to debates within philosophy of science and even to
public discourse.
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